Measure | Reason for inclusion | Source |
---|---|---|
Population density (people per sq. km) | As an infectious disease, higher density of population is likely to aid spread | |
% Population aged 65+ | Older persons more vulnerable to adverse effects of infection | |
% Population male | Adverse effect of infection might vary by sex | |
Life expectancy at birth (years) | To adjust for relative baseline health prior to pandemic | |
Hospital beds (per 1000 people) | To adjust for relative hospital capacity prior to pandemic | |
Physicians (per 1000 people) | To adjust for relative workforce capacity prior to pandemic | |
GDP PPP (current international $) | Gross Domestic Product (at Purchasing Power Parity), comparable measure of country wealth and relative average living standard. To adjust for relative deprivation across countries | |
Manufacturing, value added (%GDP) | Healthcare treatment responses to the pandemic required scale-up of various equipment (e.g. ventilators, testing equipment, and personal protective equipment), globally. Extent of manufacturing base might conceivably have changed how a country was able to respond to changes in demand internally | |
Health expenditure (%GDP) | To adjust for relative importance given to health budgets prior to pandemic | |
International tourism, number of arrivals | The virus originated in Wuhan, China. Infectious disease spread from an external source (for all other countries) will conceivably vary by extent of international movement | |
Governance (Voice and Accountability) | Different governance structures might impact when and how policies were introduced, and how strictly they were adhered to. We use a measure which captures the extent to which a country’s citizens are able to select their government, freedom of expression, association and media, i.e. extent of democracy | https://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/Home/Documents#wgiDataCrossCtry |
Region | The virus originated in the East Asia & Pacific region (Wuhan, China), so region might affect relative timing of virus arrival and any associated technological/virus evolution changes over time | |
Testing policy (h2) | With Covid-19 testing policy closely tied to attribution of Covid-19 deaths, testing policies will be inextricably linked to the outcome, i.e. more testing will offer more opportunity to attribute a death to Covid-19. We control for this difference by controlling for the extent of testing policy in a given country at a given time Coding: 0 - No testing policy; 1 - Only those who both (a) have symptoms AND (b) meet specific criteria (e.g. key workers, admitted to hospital, came into contact with a known case, returned from overseas); 2 - Testing of anyone showing COVID-19 symptoms; 3 - Open public testing (eg “drive through” testing available to asymptomatic people) | https://www.bsg.ox.ac.uk/research/research-projects/coronavirus-government-response-tracker |
Contact tracing (h3) | As above, contact tracing is closely linked and reliant on testing policy/capacity. We additionally control for the extent of contact tracing policy in a given country at a given time Coding: 0 - No contact tracing; 1 - Limited contact tracing - not done for all cases; 2 - Comprehensive contact tracing – done for all cases. | https://www.bsg.ox.ac.uk/research/research-projects/coronavirus-government-response-tracker |