Fiscal rules, powerful levers for controlling the health budget? Evidence from 32 OECD countries

BMC Public Health

Table 3 The additional impact on health care expenditure from supporting procedures

	Public health care expenditure in log
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	ER	BBR		FR
FR	0.09	−0.03*	−0.02	−0.03**	−0.03*
	(0.05)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
FR×FR legal basis Level 1	−0.17***	− 0.06***
	(0.04)	(0.02)
Level 2	0.17	0.04*
	(0.10)	(0.02)
FR × budget ceiling			−0.05***
			(0.01)
FR × independent body setting				0.01
				(0.02)
FR × independent monitoring					0.06
					(0.06)
Country FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
N	717	717	717	717	717
adj. R²	0.997	0.997	0.997	0.997	0.997

Independent variable FR is presented in different forms. In columns 1 and 2, it is presented as ER and BBR, respectively, where legal basis level 1 indicates either a political commitment or coalition agreement, level 2 indicates either a statutory and constitutional level enforcement. In columns 3 to 5, it is presented as aggregate FR. Appendix 5 provides a full table, including all control variables. Standard errors are in parentheses
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001

ISSN: 1471-2458