Fiscal rules, powerful levers for controlling the health budget? Evidence from 32 OECD countries

BMC Public Health

Table 1 The association between fiscal rules and the level of public health care expenditure

	Public health care expenditure in log
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	32 OECD countries				Exclude Cluster I countries
FR	−0.03**				− 0.04***
	(0.01)				(0.01)
ER		−0.04**				−0.05***
		(0.01)				(0.01)
BBR			−0.04**				−0.05***
			(0.01)				(0.01)
BBR (detailed levels)
National				−0.02
				(0.02)
Supranational				−0.06***
				(0.02)
Both				−0.08***
				(0.02)
Country FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
N	717	717	717	717	609	609	609
adj. R²	0.997	0.997	0.997	0.997	0.997	0.997	0.997

Columns 1 to 4 include all countries in the dataset, and column 5 to 7 exclude cluster I countries. Dependent variable public health care expenditure is adjusted for inflation and purchasing power. Appendix 3 provides a full table, including all control variables
Standard errors are in parentheses
**p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001

ISSN: 1471-2458