|         Primary objective: Impact evaluation |
---|---|
H1 | Municipal administrators in treated municipalities are aware of |
 | their treatment status |
H2 | Municipal administrators in treated municipalities audited in year 1 |
 | believe the probability of being audited in year 2 is lower than in |
 | year 3 |
H3 | Municipal administrators in treated municipalities have higher |
 | long-run beliefs about the probability of being audited |
H4 | Municipal administrators in treated municipalities have higher |
 | knowledge of FISM grant rules and regulations |
H5 | Municipal administrators in treated municipalities manifest |
 | preferences for municipal investments more in accordance with |
 | FISM priorities |
H6 | Municipal administrators in treated municipalities are more |
 | aware of lack of capacity and more likely to manifest plans for |
 | improving capacity |
H7 | Municipal administrators in treated municipalities are more likely |
 | to comply with FISM reporting and data accessibility rules |
H8 | Audited municipalities report allocating more FISM investment |
 | funds to localities outside the council seat and to public goods |
  Secondary objective: Differences between state and federal audits |  |
H9 | The federal auditor (ASF) yields more observations and more |
 | refunds to the federal treasury than state auditors (EFSL) |
H10 | The ASF yields more severe observations and opinions than EFSL |
  Tertiary objective: Interactions with local accountability system |  |
H11 | Municipal administrators in treated municipalities have different |
 | expectations about future political appointments |
H12 | Municipal administrators in treated municipalities have different |
 | expectations about career prospects |
H13 | Municipal administrators in treated municipalities perceive the |
 | ASF as a more important principal |
H14 | State governors compensate audited municipalities for refunds to |
 | the federal government |