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H1
|
Municipal administrators in treated municipalities are aware of
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their treatment status
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H2
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Municipal administrators in treated municipalities audited in year 1
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believe the probability of being audited in year 2 is lower than in
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year 3
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H3
|
Municipal administrators in treated municipalities have higher
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long-run beliefs about the probability of being audited
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H4
|
Municipal administrators in treated municipalities have higher
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| |
knowledge of FISM grant rules and regulations
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H5
|
Municipal administrators in treated municipalities manifest
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| |
preferences for municipal investments more in accordance with
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| |
FISM priorities
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H6
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Municipal administrators in treated municipalities are more
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| |
aware of lack of capacity and more likely to manifest plans for
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| |
improving capacity
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H7
|
Municipal administrators in treated municipalities are more likely
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| |
to comply with FISM reporting and data accessibility rules
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H8
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Audited municipalities report allocating more FISM investment
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| |
funds to localities outside the council seat and to public goods
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|
Secondary objective: Differences between state and federal audits
| |
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H9
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The federal auditor (ASF) yields more observations and more
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| |
refunds to the federal treasury than state auditors (EFSL)
|
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H10
|
The ASF yields more severe observations and opinions than EFSL
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|
Tertiary objective: Interactions with local accountability system
| |
|
H11
|
Municipal administrators in treated municipalities have different
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| |
expectations about future political appointments
|
|
H12
|
Municipal administrators in treated municipalities have different
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| |
expectations about career prospects
|
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H13
|
Municipal administrators in treated municipalities perceive the
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| |
ASF as a more important principal
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|
H14
|
State governors compensate audited municipalities for refunds to
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| |
the federal government
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