Table 3 Role of syndromic surveillance and other factors in supporting public health decisions a
From: The use of syndromic surveillance for decision-making during the H1N1 pandemic: A qualitative study
Public health decision | Syndromic data | Other factors supporting decision-making for SSUs | Factors supporting decision-making for NSUs |
|---|---|---|---|
Useful for: | |||
Operation of influenza assessment centres, e.g. opening/closing, location | ED data particularly used to support opening and in some instances, the location | Consultations with health care providers about pressure on the health care system | Consultations with health care providers about pressure on the health care system |
Assessment centre activity | Hospital decision | ||
Recommendations/communications to the public | Overall, provided picture of virus activity in the community and burden on the health care system to inform the timing and content of communications | Inclusion of standard infection prevention and control recommendations | Inclusion of standard infection prevention and control recommendations |
Releasing communications regularly was made part of regular practice | Guidance from the MOHLTC and provincial teleconferences | ||
Overall, provided credibility in knowing the situation to help support and reinforce messages | To be proactive | Significant event, e.g. the first lab confirmed case or death | |
Laboratory data were used to provide updates about community activity levels | Releasing communications regularly was made part of regular and collaborative practice with media | ||
Response to media requests | |||
Use of surveillance bulletins | Overall, used to communicate and provide updates on virus activity levels in the community internally and externally | Providing/updating bulletins was made part of regular practice. | Providing/updating bulletins was made part of regular practice. |
Laboratory data were included | Laboratory data were included | ||
Minimal impact on: | |||
Operation of immunization clinics, e.g. opening/closing, location | As a reflection of community activity, all data generally reinforced urgency of clinics and supported timing of closures | Vaccine supply | Vaccine supply |
Demand for vaccine | MOHLTC guidance | ||
MOHLTC guidance | Experiences with previous seasonal influenza campaigns | ||
Geographic distribution of population; physical adequacy of space to accommodate equipment, car parking and line-ups | Geographic distribution of population; physical adequacy of space to accommodate equipment, car parking and line-ups | ||
Closing schools | Overall, data showed community-wide spread and thus, would not be helpful at preventing transmission | Understanding of the potential usefulness based on the research literature and societal impact if closed. | Understanding of the potential usefulness based on the research literature and societal impact if closed. |
For some local health departments, school absenteeism data did not suggest need to close. | MOHLTC guidance | MOHLTC guidance | |
Sending information letters home with school children | School absenteeism data identified schools for targeted communication about infection prevention and control measures | First lab confirmed case or death of a child | Vaccine availability for school-aged children |
Start of the school year | First lab confirmed case or death of a child | ||
New information available from the MOHLTC | New information available from the MOHLTC | ||
Requests by schools or school boards | |||
Recommendations/messages to health care providers | Overall, data was used to update stakeholders regularly about H1N1 activity in the community and support communications with health care partners | Guidance from the MOHLTC and provincial teleconferences | Guidance from the MOHLTC and provincial teleconferences |
To maintain regular communications with health care partners | |||